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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate misconduct is a significant organizational phenomenon that has the potential to 
adversely affect various stakeholders (Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010). In the wake of a 
disclosure of major organizational misconduct ( e.g. fraud, financial restatements, environmental 
violations), research shows that there is often a backlash from multiple stakeholders (Karpoff, 
Lott, & Wehrly, 2005; Carberry, Engelen, & Van Essen, 2018). Organizational leaders are 
expected to play a critical role in preventing the occurrence of such events in the frrst place and 
mitigating their adverse impact once they do occur (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002; Hersel et al., 
2019). Given their fiduciary duties of monitoring and oversight, boards of directors are often 
expected to play a key role in the prevention and management of corporate misconduct (Neville 
et al., 2019). However, notwithstanding boards' grave responsibility and expectations in this 
area, corporate boards are not always effective in averting and effectively managing corporate 
misconduct. In this study, we focus on the phenomenon of "overboarded or busy" 
directors (Harris & Shimizu, 2004) - directors serving on multiple corporate boards. We argue 
that boards with busy directors (those serving on three or more corporate boards) are in a 
particularly weak position to effectively perform their monitoring and oversight duties that 
reduce the occurrence of organizational misconduct. Furthermore, we introduce three boundary 
conditions that enhance (mitigate) the positive relationship between the presence of busy 
directors and the occurrence of environmental misconduct. Specifically, we propose that firms 
with busy directors on their boards are more likely to have major environmental violations under 
the following conditions: 1) if the CEO is powerful; 2) the firm is experiencing financial distress; 
and 3) the furn does not have a superior ethical reputation. In the next section, we begin with 
providing a brief overview of the relationship between board oversight duties and organizational 
misconduct with a particular emphasis on busy directors. We then present and empirically test 
our theoretically derived hypotheses and conclude with a discussion and implications of our 
findings. 
Busy Directors, Board Oversight and Organizational Misconduct 
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Corporate directors, as the senior leaders and trustees of the firm, play a critical role in 
the prevention and management of organizational misconduct. Perhaps most notably, directors 
have a crucial fiduciary responsibility in monitoring the decisions and actions of the firm's senior 
executives including the CEO (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In the context of corporate misconduct, 
such responsibility often takes the form of proactively monitoring executive actions and 
decisions to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations (Nguyen et al., 2016). 
Due to their over commitment, directors experience greater cognitive limitations. As a result it 
becomes difficult for busy directors to comprehend and synthesize large volumes of information 
pertaining to a focal firm's business and make informed decisions. Furthermore, given their 
bounded rationality, busy directors are more likely to resort to 'cognitive oversimplification' and 
rules of thumbs in making decisions (Schwenk, 1988). They are less likely to have sufficient 
'cognitive bandwidth' and attention that they can dedicate to each firm they serve. These 
responsibilities may curtail their ability to proactively detect abnormalities and discrepancies in 
the activities of the focal firm, that may ultimately lead to unethical or illegal corporate practices. 
Environmental Violations as Forms of Corporate Misconduct 
Environmental violations, regulatory standards and social norms have the ability to 
negatively influence a corporation's reputation. Public perception of the violation may span the 
gamut from public condemnation to escaping public attention all together (Reuber & Fischer, 
2010). The wide span of potential attribution results in a wide range of impact on corporate 
reputation. The increase of company failures and its resultant impact on society has motivated 
the demand for corporations to provide greater transparency regarding their financial and 
mandatory obligations (Sikka, 2009). Disclosures have the potential to provide a corporation's 
private information, thereby potentially reducing investor uncertainty and market expectations 
(Luo, Courtenay, & Hossain, 2006). The potential for directors to consider their own interests 
and the resultant impact of disclosure will determine whether voluntary disclosure may take 
place. Since the corporation represents a body of people who are pursuing their own interests 
(Cyert & March, 1992), voluntary disclosure will take place based on the decision makers' 
determination whether there is a personal benefit for disclosure. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this study, we argue that the presence of busy directors on corporate boards has 
important repercussions when it comes to firm misconduct. Busy directors experience 
overcommitment due to the demand for their time and attention. Specifically, we contend that 
director "busyness" severely hampers their sense of alertness to various signs and symptoms of 
corporate misconduct (Kress, 2018). Busy directors, by virtue of their overcommitment, are more 
likely to focus on the firm's "surface level" (basic) compliance pertaining to environmental laws. 
Furthermore, they are less likely to pay attention to emerging (perhaps subtle) signs of corporate 
environmental misconduct often associated with seemingly mundane and routine firm activities 
and decisions. Additionally, given their overcommitment, busy directors are also more likely to 
take a more reactive posture with regards to the occurrence of environmental misconduct. We 
argue that these directors, given their overcommitment, are more likely to assume a "fire-
fighting" role in mitigating the impact of corporate environmental violations once they occur 
instead of proactively scrutinizing the firm's culture and decision-making processes that may 
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lead to the occurrence of such violations in the first place (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002). The above 
arguments lead us to the following hypotheses: 
Hla: The presence of busy directors on corporate boards is positively related to the 
likelihood of environmental misconduct. 
HJ b: The presence of busy directors on corporate boards is positively related to the 
.frequency of environmental misconduct. 
CEO preferences have the ability to moderate the relationship between the board and firm 
outcomes, especially when the CEO is powerful vis-a-vis the board. Powerful CEOs can threaten 
the independent judgement of the board (Dalton & Kessner, 1987), by dampening the effect of 
the board (Haynes & Hillman, 2010). We focus on the influence of CEO power as it is a 
dominate characteristic used to interpret and respond to environmental issues (Sharma, 2000). 
CEO power may manifest in various forms. We rely on Finkelstein's definition of CEO power, 
as "the capacity of individual actors to exert their will" (Finkelstein, 1992: 506). The 
characteristics of the CEO will likely have a significant influence on how the firm responds to 
institutional pressures (Lewis, Walls, & Dowell, 2014). Powerful CEOs have the ability to enact 
their own interests, thereby shaping how corporations respond (Cyert & March, 1992). Further, 
powerful CEOs in the context of busy directors have the ability to pursue activities that benefit 
themselves. The relationship between busy directors and environmental misconduct will be 
strengthened in the context of a powerful CEO. CEOs with power have the ability to leverage 
entrenchment (via any one of the sources of power) to influence decisions that support their 
continued control (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Our arguments for CEO power 
result in the following hypotheses: 
H2a: The degree of CEO power positively moderates the relationship between the 
presence of busy directors and the likelihood of environmental misconduct such that the 
relationship is stronger for firms led by powerful CEOs. 
H2b: The degree of CEO power positively moderates the relationship between the 
presence of busy directors and the .frequency of environmental misconduct such that the 
relationship is stronger for firms led by powerful CEOs. 
Firm ethical reputation can be defined as "a general organizational attribute that reflects 
the extent to which external stakeholders see the firm as good and not bad" (Roberts & Dowling, 
2002: 1078). In this study, we argue that firm ethical reputation is likely to weaken the 
relationship between director busyness and environmental violations for a number of reasons. 
First, ethical reputation creates an intangible asset that reduces uncertainty concerning a firm's 
actions in a given ethical situation (Bear et al., 2010; Baselga-Pascual et al., 2018). Firms with 
superior ethical reputation are more likely to follow established ethical safeguards and standards 
of practice. Second, firms with superior ethical reputation are not only expected to engage in 
ethical behavior, but also are expected to prevent unethical behavior and comply with rules and 
regulations (Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2018). As such, even if board members pay less attention to 
environmental issues, top executives will feel psychological pressure to maintain the firm's 
superior ethical reputation and will take initiatives to avoid incidents of environmental 
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misconduct. Finally, board members will tend to identify more intensively with firms having 
superior ethical reputations (Mael & Ashforth 1992). As a result, they will spend more time in 
monitoring activities and pay more attention to the environmental issues of firms with high 
ethical reputation as compared to the firms with low ethical reputation. Based on the above 
arguments, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H3a: Firm ethical reputation negatively moderates the relationship between the presence 
of busy directors and the likelihood of environmental misconduct such that the 
relationship is weaker for firms with superior ethical reputation. 
H3b: Firm ethical reputation negatively moderates the relationship between the presence 
of busy directors and the frequency of environmental misconduct such that the 
relationship is weaker for firms with superior ethical reputation. 
The degree of financial distress a firm experiences is an important contingency factor that 
may exacerbates the extent to which the presence of busy directors increases the occurrence of 
environmental misconduct. Scholars have used the arguments from General Strain Theory 
(Agnew et al., 2009) to provide some explanations. According to the core tenets of this theory, 
individuals and organizations often resort to unethical and/or illegal behavior when they perceive 
that they are unable to achieve their goals through established social and institutional channels. 
Such a "goal blockage" (Agnew et al., 2009), or the gap between the desired and actual level of 
performance may lead to desperate or extreme measures from organizational leaders in order to 
close such a gap (Simpson, 2002). Firms in financial distress often face existential crisis with 
their viability, as a going concern is seriously challenged. Financial distress not only adversely 
affects the short-term liquidity of the firm, but also hampers long term solvency and the firm's 
ability to honor its financial commitments to its stakeholders (Hambrick & D' Aveni, 1988). 
Financially distressed firms, therefore, are more likely to seek cost-cutting measures, including 
possibly significantly reducing their sustainability investments (Singal, 2014) and even resort to 
pursuing illegal environmental practices that violate established federal and state level 
environmental statutes. The above arguments lead us to the following hypotheses: 
H4a: Financial distress negatively moderates the relationship between the presence of 
busy directors and the likelihood of environmental misconduct such that the relationship 
is weaker for firms that are financially less distressed. 
H4b: Financial distress negatively moderates the relationship between the presence of 
busy directors and the frequency of environmental misconduct such that the relationship 
is weaker for firms that are financially less distressed. 
METHODS 
Sample and Data Sources 
To test our predictions, we used data from U.S.-based, publicly traded firms listed in the 
Standard & Poor' s (S&P 500) composite index. After removing firms that are privately held and 
those with missing data, our final sample comprised of 492 U.S.-based, publicly traded firms. 
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We used a 10-year sampling window (2007-2016) to ensure that we observe patterns of 
environmental misconduct among S&P 500 firms across the economic cycle. The final panel 
dataset consisted of 4920 firm-year observations (492 firms over ten years). Our primary source 
of data on environmental misconduct (violations) was Violation Tracker 
(https://www.goodjobsfust.org/violation-tracker), an online database maintained by Corporate 
Research Project. The database reports extensive data on each firm including instances of 
environmental violations along with primary offense, description of offense, and Agency 
initiating the complaint, penalty year, and penalty amount. Data on busy directors was obtained 
from BoardEx and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)/Risk Metrics databases. These 
databases provide extensive information on individual directors' demographic and professional 
profiles along with the number of corporate boards they serve on. Data on our executive and 
organizational controls were obtained from ExecuComp and Compustat databases. 
Measures 
We measured the Likelihood of Environmental Misconduct as the binary variable taking 
the value of" l" if a sample firm had at least one environmental violation during the sampling 
window (2007-2016), "0" otherwise. The Frequency of Environmental Misconduct was 
operationalized as a count variable representing the number of environmental violations for each 
furn in the sample during the sampling window (2007-2016). We operationalized busy directors 
as those outside directors that serve on three or more corporate boards. We aggregated individual 
director data to the board level by using a dummy coding of" l" for firms with at least one 
"busy" director (serving on three or more other corporate boards) on their boards and "0" 
otherwise. Following other works (Finkelstein, 1992; Haynes & Hillman, 2010), we measured 
CEO Power as a multidimensional construct consisting of ownership (CEO percent of equity 
ownership and CEO founder status), structural (CEO duality), expert (CEO tenure) and prestige 
power (number of other boards served). These variables were standardized and summed to create 
a composite measure of CEO power. Financial Distress was operationalized using Altman 
(1983)'s bankruptcy Z-score (Barker & Mone, 1994; Abebe, Angriawan, & Liu, 2010). AZ-
score of 3 or above usually indicates that the firm is in sound financial condition, while a score 
below 3 suggests financial distress with lower values indicating a higher likelihood of 
bankruptcy. Firm Ethical Reputation was operationalized using data from the annual "World's 
Most Ethical Companies" rankings compiled by the Ethisphere Institute. We reviewed this 
annual rankings data and coded each sample firm as "l" if it was included in the rankings and 
"0" otherwise for each year of the sampling period (2007-2016). We controlled for several 
governance (Board Size, Board Independence, Presence of Lone CEO Director) and 
organizational (Firm Age and Firm Size) indicators that are likely to influence our outcome 
variable ( corporate environmental violations). 
Analytical Approach 
To estimate the likelihood of environmental violations, we employed a panel logistic 
regression analysis given the binary nature of the variable (Zorn et al., 2017). Our second 
dependent variable is the frequency of environmental violations. Since a large portion of our 
sample firms (82.48%) did not have any environmental violations during the sampling window 
(2007-2016), this variable is truncated with several zero values. Accordingly, to account for such 
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truncation in the data, we employed a panel to bit regression analysis which uses a maximum 
likelihood estimation method. To address endogeneity concerns, we followed a two-step 
approach (Koch-Bayram & Wernicke, 2018). In the first step, we used a probit model to regress 
a binary busy directors variable on firm age, firm size, average director age and firm 
performance. In the second stage, we used the residuals from the first stage probit analysis as our 
revised presence of busy director measure in the main analyses. 
RESULTS 
Our findings indicate that the presence of busy directors on corporate boards is positively 
related to the likelihood (/J = 2.019,p < 0.05) and frequency (/J = 5.645,p < 0.05) of 
environmental misconduct lending empirical support to hypothesis 1 a and 1 b. Results show that 
the interaction term between the presence of busy directors and CEO power, contrary to our 
prediction, is not statistically significant for both the likelihood (/J = 0.154, n.s.) and frequency (/J 
= 0.123, n.s.) of environmental misconduct. Accordingly, hypothesis 2a and 2b did not receive 
empirical support. Similarly, the coefficient of the presence of busy directors was not statistically 
significant predictor of both the likelihood (/J =1.972, n.s.) and frequency (/J = 0.813, n.s.) of 
environmental misconduct for the firms that are included in ethical ranking. However, in case of 
firms that are not included in ethical ranking, the presence of busy directors is positive and 
statistically significant predictor of the likelihood (/J = 2.052,p < 0.05) and frequency (/J = 2.023, 
p < 0. 01) of environmental misconduct. Based on these analyses, hypothesis 3a and 3b received 
empirical support. Finally, the coefficient for the interaction term between presence of busy 
directors and financial distress was positive and statistically significant for both the likelihood (/J 
= 0.409,p < 0.01) and frequency (/J = 0.842,p < 0. 05) of environmental misconduct. 
Accordingly, hypothesis 4a and 4b received empirical support. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study explored the relationship between the presence of busy directors on corporate 
boards and the likelihood and frequency of environmental misconduct. The findings indicate 
that, consistent with our predictions, the likelihood and frequency of environmental misconduct 
is higher among firms with busy directors on their boards. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the 
presence of busy directors on corporate boards may lead to a higher likelihood and frequency of 
environmental misconduct among firms that experience high financial distress. Environmental 
compliance and sustainability initiatives can be costly (Sprinkle & Maines, 2010), and are more 
likely to be compromised when the firm experiences financial distress (Singal, 2014). 
Additionally, we found that the relationship between the presence of busy directors on corporate 
boards and the likelihood and frequency of environmental misconduct tends to be stronger 
among firms that did not have a superior ethical reputation. This finding further underscores the 
importance of robust organizational ethical climate as a defensive mechanism against the 
occurrence of corporate misconduct. Overall, this study sheds light on the organizational 
consequences of overboarded directors as it relates to environmental misconduct. 
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